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Abstract
Whether we want to make sense of the presence of consciousness
in a seemingly material world or understand the role (if any) that
consciousness plays in the fundamental theoretical framework of con-
temporary physics, it is imperative that we distinguish between two
concepts of reality: an epistemically inaccessible transcendental real-
ity and an empirical reality experienced and objectified by us. After a
summary of Bohr’s views and their relation to Kant’s theory of science,
two fruitless lines of attack on the measurement problem are discussed:
the way of the ψ-ontologist and the way of the QBist. In the remainder
of the paper the following results are obtained. (i) Because the testable
correlations between outcomes of measurements of macroscopic posi-
tions are consistent with both the classical and the quantum laws, there
is no conflict between the superposition principle and the existence of
measurement outcomes. (ii) Intrinsically, each fundamental particle
is numerically identical with every other fundamental particle. What
presents itself here and now with these properties and what presents
itself there and then with those properties is one and the same entity,
herein called “Being.” (iii) The distinction between a classical domain
and a quantum domain is essentially a distinction between the mani-
fested world and its manifestation. By entering into reflexive spatial
relations, Being gives rise to (a) what looks like a multiplicity of relata
if the reflexive quality of the relations is ignored, and (b) what looks
like a substantial expanse if the spatial quality of the relations is reified.
(iv) The reason why quantum mechanics is a calculus of correlations
between measurement outcomes is that it concerns the progressive real-
ization of distinguishable objects and distinguishable regions of space.
(v) The key to the relation between quantum mechanics and experience
is that Being does not simply manifest the world; Being manifests the
world to itself. It is at once the single substance by which the world
exists and the ultimate self or subject for which it exists. The question
how we are related to this ultimate self or subject is discussed.
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1 Introduction
Claims about the relation between quantum mechanics and experience are
generally made in either of two contexts. The first context is the interpreta-
tion of quantum mechanics. “The dynamics by itself” [1] does not seem to
yield the definite measurement outcomes that we experience, and our expe-
rience does not seem to be compatible with the superpositions that quantum
mechanics predicts. Quantum mechanics appears to require preternatural
interventions into the course of Nature, and the obvious perpetrator of such
interventions is the consciousness of the observer. Today the most promi-
nent exponent of this relation between quantum mechanics and experience
is Stapp [2]. The second context is the problem of explaining how objective
physical processes in a brain give rise to subjective experiences. In this con-
text it has been argued (to give just one example) that quantum coherence
in microtubules might be the neural basis for consciousness [3]. In both con-
texts it is assumed that the aim of science is to describe a mind-independent
reality, and that in addition there is consciousness or experience. In the first
context consciousness is invoked to solve the notorious measurement prob-
lem, while in the second context it is invoked to explain the mysterious
presence of consciousness in a seemingly material world.
In this paper I argue that it is not the aim of science to describe a
mind-independent reality. Rather, science is concerned with the objectifiable
aspects of our experience. Whether we want to make sense of the presence of
consciousness in a seemingly material world or to grasp the role (if any) that
experience plays in the fundamental theoretical framework of contemporary
physics, it is imperative that we distinguish between two concepts of reality:
the objectified world-as-we-know-it and the epistemically inaccessible world-
in-itself. The necessity of drawing this distinction was first emphasized by
Immanuel Kant in the 18th Century and was reaffirmed by Niels Bohr in
the 20th. Section 2 contains a brief summary of Bohr’s views, and Sect. 3
discusses the relation between Bohr’s views and Kant’s theory of science.
Failure to distinguish the middle-ground between the experiencing and
objectifying subject and the world-in-itself—i.e., failure to acknowledge that
physical science concerns a reality experienced and objectified by us—gives
rise to two fruitless lines of attack on the quantum measurement prob-
lem: the way of the “ψ-ontologist” and the way of the QBist or Quantum
Bayesian. The former looks upon the evolution of the wave function as a
physical process taking place in a mind-independent reality, the latter looks
upon quantum theory as an addition to Bayesian probability theory. After a
critique of the first line of attack, Sect. 4 counters a QBist critique of Bohr,
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and Sect. 5 offers a critique of the salient points of QBism.
If the preconceptions that go into the interpretation of a theory them-
selves obey the laws of the theory, the theory is said to be semantically
consistent. If quantum mechanics is to be semantically consistent then even
outcome-indicating observables must obey the theory’s correlation laws, in
spite of the intrinsic definiteness of our experience, which would seem to
imply that such observables are exempt from the superposition principle.
In Sect. 6 the semantic consistency of quantum mechanics is demonstrated
by first showing that the theory implies the incompleteness of the world’s
spatiotemporal differentiation: this does not go “all the way down.” Hence
follows the existence of macroscopic objects, defined as objects whose trajec-
tories are only counterfactually indefinite: no value-indicating event reveals
the indefiniteness of a macroscopic position in the only way it could, through
a departure from what the classical laws predict. The testable correlations
between outcomes of measurements of macroscopic positions are therefore
consistent with both the classical and the quantum laws, so that there is no
conflict between the superposition principle and the existence of measure-
ment outcomes.
We are now in a position to think about the objectifiable implications
of the quantum-mechanical correlation laws without having to keep in mind
our role as experiencing and objectifying subjects. The safest way to pro-
ceed is to use that formulation of quantum mechanics which carries the
least metaphysical baggage, which is due to Feynman. We also need an
interpretive principle, which is introduced in Sect. 7 and applied to two
paradigmatic setups, one concerning distinctions between regions of space,
the other concerning distinctions between things. The main conclusion of
this section is that, intrinsically, each fundamental particle is numerically
identical with every other fundamental particle. What presents itself here
and now with these properties and what presents itself there and then with
those properties is one and the same entity, herein called “Being.”
The main conclusion of Sect. 8 is that the distinction between the macro-
scopic or classical domain and the microscopic or quantum domain is essen-
tially a distinction between the manifested world and its manifestation. It
is by entering into reflexive spatial relations—i.e., self-relations, relations
between numerically identical relata—that Being gives rise to (i) what looks
like a multiplicity of relata if the reflexive quality of the relations is ig-
nored, and (ii) what looks like a substantial expanse if the spatial quality
of the relations is reified. Seen in this light, quantum theory reverses the
explanatory arrow of classical or folk physics: instead of explaining wholes
in terms of interacting parts, it suggests that the multiplicity of the world
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emerges from an intrinsically undifferentiated reality, through a series of
stages in which the world’s differentiation into distinguishable regions of
space and distinguishable objects with definite properties is progressively
realized.
We next turn to the question what quantum mechanics may actually
have to do with experience. The most promising alternative to reduction-
ism in the philosophy of mind is panpsychism. Noting that all physical
properties are relational or extrinsic, proponents of panpsychism embrace
the possibility of situating consciousness among the intrinsic properties of
the relata which bear the relational properties. The problem with this pos-
sibility is the difficulty of explaining how the consciousnesses of a myriad
of particles can be combined into a complex and rich consciousness such
as that we possess [4]. If however we take into account not only that all
physical properties are relational but also that all relational properties are
reflexive, so that the relata are identically the same Being, the concept of
consciousness as an intrinsic property of the relata comes into its own.
How does this intrinsic property of Being relate to the manifestation?
The answer is that Being does not simply manifest the world; Being mani-
fests the world to itself. Being relates to the world not only as the substance
that constitutes it but also as the consciousness that contains it. It is at
once the single substance by which the world exists and the ultimate self or
subject for which it exists. The question then is how we, as conscious beings,
are related to this ultimate self or subject, and this is addressed in Sect. 9,
which takes its cue from the Indian philosopher (and freedom fighter, and
mystic) Sri Aurobindo [5, 6].
The concluding section recapitulates arguments to the effect that the
validity of quantum mechanics is but a necessary consequence of the manner
in which—and the purpose for which—the physical world came into being
[7, 8, 9]. Finally, our attempts to make sense of the world in which we find
ourselves are put in perspective.
2 Bohr and “experience”
Bohr’s claim was that the classical language is indispensable.
This has remained valid up to the present day. At the individual
level of clicks in particle detectors and particle tracks on pho-
tographs, all measurement results have to be expressed in classi-
cal terms. Indeed, the use of the familiar physical quantities of
length, time, mass, and momentum–energy at a subatomic scale
4
is due to an extrapolation of the language of classical physics to
the non-classical domain. — Brigitte Falkenburg [10, p. 162]
Kant taught us to distinguish between two concepts of reality, a transcen-
dental reality and an empirical one, and Bohr stressed the need for this
distinction when he reminded us that “in our description of nature the pur-
pose is not to disclose the real essence of the phenomena but only to track
down, so far as it is possible, relations between the manifold aspects of our
experience” [11, pp. 17–18]. Bohr’s reminder has been misconstrued nearly
as often as it has been quoted. A recent example is Mermin [12], who in
a comment published in Nature maintains that Bohr “taught that physical
science studies our experience.” What would have been more correct to
say is that physical science, according to Bohr, studies not our experience
qua experience but the objectifiable aspects of our experience. The reason
Bohr refers to the relations between the manifold aspects of our experi-
ence is that these relations make it possible to objectify certain aspects of
our experience—to represent them as aspects of a reality from which we,
the objectifying subjects, can abstract ourselves. Because of our familiarity
with the logical/grammatical relation between a subject and its predicates it
makes sense to us to think of the content of our experience as the properties
of substances. Because of our familiarity with the conditional relation be-
tween propositions it makes sense to us to think of the successive (or timelike
related) aspects of our experience as properties related by causality, and it
makes sense to us to think of the simultaneous (or spacelike related) aspects
of our experience as a self-existent system of interacting substances. It is
because Bohr considered the categorial structure implicit in the language
of classical physics a sine qua non of empirical science that he insisted on
the use of this language in describing experiments and reporting their re-
sults. This structure is in all significant respects identical with the system
of categories that Kant had shown to be a precondition of the possibility of
empirical knowledge.1
To determine the import of Bohr’s reminder, one has to take account of
its context [11, p. 17–18]:
1In a talk given three months after the publication of his Nature comment, Mermin [13]
takes a stab at elucidating Bohr’s meaning of “experience”: “by ‘experience’ he almost
certainly meant the objective readings of large classical instruments.” Taken together, the
two statements—that physical science studies our experience, and that experience stands
for the objective readings of large classical instruments—imply that, according to Bohr,
physical science studies the objective readings of large classical instruments, which is a
crude statement of instrumentalism and an insult to Bohr.
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Now, what gives to the quantum-theoretical description its pecu-
liar characteristic is just this, that in order to evade the quantum
of action we must use separate experimental arrangements to
obtain accurate measurements of the different quantities, the si-
multaneous knowledge of which would be required for a complete
description based upon the classical theories, and, further, that
these experimental results cannot be supplemented by repeated
measurements. . . . a subsequent measurement to a certain degree
deprives the information given by a previous measurement of its
significance for predicting the future course of the phenomena.
Obviously, these facts not only set a limit to the extent of the in-
formation obtainable by measurements, but they also set a limit
to the meaning which we may attribute to such information. We
meet here in a new light the old truth that in our description of
nature the purpose is not to disclose the real essence of the phe-
nomena but only to track down, so far as it is possible, relations
between the manifold aspects of our experience.
What occupied Bohr was “the task of bringing order into an entirely new
field of experience” [14, p. 228], a field of experience that places limits on
“the extent of the information obtainable by measurements” and on “the
meaning which we may attribute to such information.” When Bohr spoke of
a “field of experience,” when he insisted that it “lies in the nature of physical
observation, that all experience must ultimately be expressed in terms of
classical concepts” [11], and when he pointed out that “the requirement
of communicability of the circumstances and results of experiments implies
that we can speak of well defined experiences only within the framework
of ordinary concepts” [15], he was concerned with the objectifiable content
of our experience, i.e., an objective reality inevitably conditioned by our
experience and the concepts at our disposal but capable of being thought
and spoken about without explicit reference to its being experienced or
thought and spoken about.
The key to making sense of Bohr, and quite possibly the key to making
sense of quantum mechanics itself, is the distinction between two concepts
of reality:
(I) a transcendental reality undisclosed in experience, which forms or in-
cludes the ground of our experience and of ourselves as experiencing
subjects, and
(II) the product of a mental synthesis, based on the spatiotemporal struc-
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ture of our experience, achieved with the help of relational concepts
inherent in our language, and resulting in a knowable empirical reality
from which the objectifying subject can abstract itself.
The necessity of drawing a clear distinction between a transcendental or
“veiled” reality and a knowable or “empirical” reality has more recently
been stressed by d’Espagnat [16, 17, 18, 19].
Nothing is more central to Bohr’s views than the dual necessity (i) of
defining observables in terms of the experimental arrangements by which
they are measured and (ii) of describing these arrangements in classical
terms. Because the limits placed on simultaneous measurements of incom-
patible observables imply “a complementarity of the possibilities of defini-
tion” [11, p. 78], observables can no longer be defined without reference to
the “agency of observation” [11, pp. 54, 67] (i.e., the experimental appa-
ratus), so that the “procedure of measurement has an essential influence
on the conditions on which the very definition of the physical quantities in
question rests” [20]. The “distinction between object and agency of mea-
surement” is therefore “inherent in our very idea of observation” [11, p. 68].
And since “[o]nly with the help of classical ideas is it possible to ascribe an
unambiguous meaning to the results of observation” [11, p. 94], “it would
be a misconception to believe that the difficulties of the atomic theory may
be evaded by eventually replacing the concepts of classical physics by new
conceptual forms” [11, p. 16]. For summaries of Bohr’s mature views, which
“remained more or less stable at least over the latter thirty years of Bohr’s
life” [21, p. 138], see Kaiser [22] and MacKinnon [23].
3 Bohr and Kant
In my opinion, those who really want to understand contempo-
rary physics—i.e., not only to apply physics in practice but also
to make it transparent—will find it useful, even indispensable at
a certain stage, to think through Kant’s theory of science.
— Carl Friedrich von Weizsa¨cker [24, p. 328]
Affinities between Bohr and Kant have been noted by a number of com-
mentators [22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32], including Cuffaro [33],
who holds that any interpretation of Bohr should start with Kant. Kant
owes his fame in large part to his successful navigation between the Scylla
of transcendental realism (which eventually runs up against the impossible
task of explaining the subject in terms of the object) and the Charybdis of
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a Berkeley-style idealism. What allowed him to steer clear of both horns of
the dilemma was a dramatic change of strategy. Instead of trying to formu-
late a metaphysical picture of the world consistent with Newton’s theory,
as he had done during the pre-critical period of his philosophy, he inquired
into the cognitive conditions that are (i) necessary for the possibility of em-
pirical knowledge and (ii) sufficient for the objective status of Newtonian
mechanics. He recognized, as Bitbol [28] has put it, “that the land sought
by metaphysics can be foreign to us not due to the excessive distance we
have with it, but rather due to its excessive proximity to us.”
Kant’s reading of classical mechanics dispelled many qualms that had
been shared by thinkers at the end of the eighteenth century—qualms about
the purely mathematical nature of Newtonian mechanics, about its partial
lack of intelligibility (e.g., action at a distance), and about such unfamiliar
features as Galileo’s principle of relativity. The mathematical nature of
Newton’s theory was justified not by the Neo-Platonic belief that the book of
nature was written in mathematical language but by being a precondition of
empirical knowledge. What permits us to look upon the manifold aspects of
our experience as the constituents of an objective world is the mathematical
regularities that exist between them. They make it possible to synthesize
these aspects into a system of interacting re-identifiable objects from which
the experiencing subject can remove itself.
Similarly, Newton’s refusal to explain gravitational action at a distance
was due not to any incompleteness of his theory but to the fact that the only
causality available to us consists in regular mathematical relations between
successive states or between objects in different locations. For A to be
causally related to B is for A to stand in a regular mathematical relation to
B. We thus lack the concepts to explain action at a distance. As for Galileo’s
principle of relativity, which asserts that motion is always relative, it is a
direct consequence of the fact that regular mathematical relations only exists
between particular aspects of experience, i.e., between successive events and
between objects in different locations, but never between a particular aspect
of experience and a general form of experience, time or space.
In the course of the nineteenth century, most philosophers and many of
the scientists who cared to reflect on the nature of science came to adopt (or,
in some cases, reinvent) Kant’s epistemology. It alleviated the loss of tran-
scendental realism by justifying the use of a universal objectivist language,
which made it possible to think and behave as if transcendental realism
were true. The advent of quantum mechanics dealt a severe blow to this
comfortable attitude. Atoms were found to respect neither Kant’s aprior-
ism (e.g., the assertion that the possibility of empirical knowledge requires
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the universal validity of the law of causality) nor his principle of thorough-
going determination, which asserts that “among all possible predicates of
things, insofar as they are compared with their opposites, one must apply
to [each thing] as to its possibility” [34, p. 553]. Neither Kant’s apriorism
nor his principle of thoroughgoing determination, however, though signifi-
cant elements of his thinking, are central to his theory of science. There are
therefore more ways to respond to this blow than relapsing into transcen-
dental realism, embracing a Berkeley-style idealism, or resigning oneself to a
metaphysically sterile instrumentalism. In Bohr’s case, MacKinnon writes,
the crisis
precipitated something akin to a Gestalt shift, a shift in focal at-
tention from the objects studied to the conceptual system used
to study them. This effect was somewhat similar to the epoche´
advocated by Husserl. He stressed the need for philosophers to
bracket the natural standpoint and consider it as a represen-
tational system, rather than the reality represented. Similarly,
Bohr’s realization of the essential failure of the pictures in space
and time on which the description of natural phenomena have
hitherto been based shifted the focus of attention from the phe-
nomena represented to the system that served as a vehicle of
representation. [23, p. 97]
Bohr’s “epoche´” mirrors the seminal change of strategy that had enabled
Kant to navigate between the Scylla of realism and the Charybdis of ide-
alism. Where Kant had famously stressed that “[t]houghts without con-
tent are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind” [34, p. 193], Bohr
could have said that without measurements the formal apparatus of quan-
tum mechanics is empty, while measurements without the formal apparatus
of quantum mechanics are blind. To look beyond the directly experienced
world, one needs the formal apparatus, and one needs experimental arrange-
ments situated in that world, “the specification of which is imperative for
any well-defined application of the quantum-mechanical formalism” [35, p.
57]. Instead of preventing us from looking beyond the classically describable
world, the mutual exclusion of experimental procedures opens a window on
what lies beyond: “it is only the mutual exclusion of any two experimental
procedures, permitting the unambiguous definition of complementary phys-
ical quantities, which provides room for new physical laws, the co-existence
of which might at first sight appear irreconcilable with the basic principles
of science” [35, p. 61].
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For Bohr, as for Kant, there is an intimate connection between percep-
tion, conditioned by the spatiotemporal aspects of experience, and concep-
tion. Kant saw conception as organizing the content of experience into an
effectively subject-independent world of re-identifiable objects and causally
connected events. Bohr saw conception as providing the unambiguous lan-
guage necessary for the clear-cut separation of the subject from the object:
“all subjectivity is avoided by proper attention to the circumstances re-
quired for the well-defined use of elementary physical concepts” [36, pp.
7] Far from invalidating Kant’s epistemological stance, quantum theory re-
minds us of the interplay of perception and conception in the construction
of the objective world. Bohr’s departure from Kant is not a departure from
Kant’s epistemological stance but a consequence of quantum theory’s depar-
ture from classical physics. It is an irony that Bohr, seeing Kant as arguing
for the a priori necessity of Newtonian physics, regarded complementarity
as an alternative to Kant’s theory of science, thus drawing the battle lines
in a way which put Kant and himself on opposing sides.
What allowed Bohr to go beyond Kant was the discovery that empirical
knowledge is not limited to what is accessible to our senses, and that it does
not have to be a knowledge of interacting objects and causally connected
events. What is not directly accessible to our senses, however, cannot be
expected to conform to the spatiotemporal conditions of experience and to
the concepts depending on them, such as position and momentum, time and
energy, causality and interaction. “It is my personal opinion,” Bohr wrote
to the philosopher Harald Høffding [37], “that these difficulties are of such
a nature that they hardly allow us to hope that we shall be able, within the
world of the atom, to carry through a description in space and time that
corresponds to our ordinary sensory perceptions.”
I cannot but agree with Folse when he writes [31]: “It is often said that
a work of genius resists categorization. If so, Bohr’s philosophical viewpoint
easily passes this criterion of greatness. Surely this is one of the reasons for
the commonplace complaints over Bohr’s ‘obscurity’.” Historically, Bohr’s
reply [38] to the EPR paper was taken as a definitive refutation by the
physics community. By the time interpreting quantum mechanics became a
growth industry, Bohr’s perspective was lost. His epistemological reflections
generally came to be treated on a par with a proliferating multitude of on-
tological interpretations of a mathematically formulated theory, and as such
they could not but seem amateurish, outdated, ad hoc, bizarre, or down-
right irrational. This is how Jeffrey Bub [39, pp. 45–46] came to conclude
that
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The careful phraseology of complementarity . . . endows an un-
acceptable theory of measurement with mystery and apparent
profundity, where clarity would reveal an unsolved problem,
how Abner Shimony [40] came to confess that
after 25 years of attentive—and even reverent—reading of Bohr,
I have not found a consistent and comprehensive framework for
the interpretation of quantum mechanics,
and how Edwin Jaynes [41] came to see in “our present QM formalism”
a peculiar mixture describing in part realities of Nature, in part
incomplete human information about Nature—all scrambled up
by Heisenberg and Bohr into an omelette that nobody has seen
how to unscramble.
It would therefore seem appropriate to close this section with the following
words by Hooker [21, pp. 132–133]:
it is a remarkable commentary on the state of confusion and
misunderstanding now existing in the field that Bohr’s unique
views are almost universally either overlooked completely or dis-
torted beyond recognition—this by philosophers of science and
scientists alike. Despite the fact that there are almost as many
philosophies of quantum theory as there are major quantum the-
orists, the illusion somehow persists that they are all talking
about the same thing and in essentially the same way. . . . so
many people can apparently read Bohr and not grasp the signif-
icance of what he was driving at.
4 The quantum measurement problem
The most satisfying way to end a philosophical dispute is to find
a false presupposition that underlies all the puzzles it involves.
— Bas van Fraassen [42, p. 434]
What distinguishes Bohr’s unique views from other quantum philosophies
is his recognition of an objective middle-ground between the experiencing
and objectifying subject and the epistemically inaccessible object. Failure
to distinguish this middle-ground—the empirical (type-II) reality—from the
transcendental (type-I) reality gives rise to two fruitless lines of attack on the
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quantum measurement problem. The first is the way of the ψ-ontologist,2
who believes the evolution of the wave function to be a physical process tak-
ing place in a mind-independent reality. That this line of attack is doomed
to fail follows from, among other things, the insolubility proofs of the objec-
tification problem due to Mittelstaedt [44, Sect. 4.3b] and Busch et al. [45,
Sect. III.6.2].
The peculiar meaning of “objectification” in the literature on the quan-
tum measurement problem must not be confused with the regular sense of
the word, which refers to the representation of a concept as a real or concrete
object. The objectification problem is an artifact of the manner in which
the measurement problem has been discussed ever since its first rigorous
formulations in the monographs of von Neumann [46] and Pauli [47]. One
assumes that there is such a thing as a measurement process, and that this
takes place in three steps: the system or state preparation, a continuous
dynamical process called “premeasurement” (p), and the appearance of an
outcome called “objectification” (o):
∑
k
ck|A0〉|qk〉
(p)
−→
∑
k
ck|Ak〉|qk〉
(o)
−→ |A(q)〉|q〉.
Every interpretation of quantum mechanics that attaches to a quantum state
a significance beyond that of a probability algorithm, founders over the tran-
sition from the state that is supposed to complete the premeasurement to the
state that is supposed to complete the measurement, in which q (one of the
possible outcomes qk) is indicated. One of the reasons it founders is that the
state vector’s or wave function’s dependence on time is not the continuous
time-dependence of an evolving physical state. The time it depends on is the
time of the measurement to the possible outcomes of which it serves to as-
sign probabilities. As Peres [48] has stressed, “there is no interpolating wave
function giving the ‘state of the system’ between measurements”.3 Nothing
2Not to be confused with a Scientologist. For the origin of this subtly suggestive term
see Note 3 of Ref. [43].
3Here Peres echoes Bohr’s insistence that what happens between the preparation of a
system and a measurement is a holistic phenomenon, which cannot be decomposed into
the unitary evolution of a quantum state and a subsequent “collapse” of the same: “all
unambiguous interpretation of the quantum mechanical formalism involves the fixation of
the external conditions, defining the initial state of the atomic system concerned and the
character of the possible predictions as regards subsequent observable properties of that
system. Any measurement in quantum theory can in fact only refer either to a fixation
of the initial state or to the test of such predictions, and it is first the combination of
measurements of both kinds which constitutes a well-defined phenomenon.” [49]
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good can come out of the transmogrification of a probability algorithm into
an evolving physical state.
During a successful measurement, the apparatus changes from a neutral
state, in which it is ready to perform its function, to a state in which it
indicates an outcome, but this change does not follow the unitary “evolu-
tion” of the quantum state of a composite system into a superposition of
the form
∑
k ck|ak〉|bk〉, where |ak〉 and |bk〉 are eigenstates of observables
A and B. This superposition “obtains” at a time t only in the conditional
sense that a joint measurement of A and B, made at the time t, would (or
will) indicate the pair of outcomes ak and bk with probability |ck|
2, and that
it would (or will) indicate the pair of outcomes ai and bk with probability 0
if i 6= k. The strict correlation between the possible outcomes of the two
observables then warrants another conditional statement, to wit: if (say) a
measurement of A yields ak, then a measurement of B would (or will) yield
bk with probability 1. What it does not warrant is the claim that B then has
the value bk. Probability 1 is not sufficient for “is” or “has.” The so-called
eigenvalue-eigenstate link, a commonly accepted interpretive principle, must
therefore be rejected.4
The second fruitless line of attack is the way of the QBist or Quantum
Bayesian [43, 51, 52, 53]. QBists hold that quantum theory is an addition
to Bayesian probability theory. It provides each “user of science” with a
calculus for gambling on her respective experiences. Because the odds as-
signed by different users are based on their respective prior experiences,
which generally differ, QBists believe that there are potentially as many
quantum states for a given system as there are users of the theory. While
they agree with Bohr that the events to which quantum mechanics assigns
probabilities are measurement outcomes, they define “measurement” as an
“action an agent takes to elicit a set of possible experiences,” and they de-
fine a “measurement outcome” as “the particular experience of that agent
elicited in this way” [54]. Because measurement outcomes are thus relative
to individual users/agents, a user/agent has to subject everything but her
“own direct internal awareness of her own private experience” to the super-
position principle, including reports of measurement outcomes she has yet
4Here is how this principle was formulated by Dirac [50, pp. 46–47]: “The expression
that an observable ‘has a particular value’ for a particular state is permissible . . . in the
special case when a measurement of the observable is certain to lead to the particular value,
so that the state is an eigenstate of the observable.” At bottom, to solve the objectification
problem is to find a dynamical explanation for the transition from probability 1 to “is” or
“has.” The reason there is no solution is that there can be no dynamical explanation for
an interpretive principle like the eigenvalue-eigenstate link.
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to receive from other users/agents.
QBists are wrong on several points, to be discussed in the next section,
and in their critique of Bohr (“Copenhagen”), to be discussed in the re-
mainder of this section. QBists blame the trouble we face in our attempts
to make sense of quantum mechanics on “our ingrained practice of divorcing
the objects of our investigations from the subjective experiences they induce
in us” [54]. In doing so, they conflate the type-II reality investigated by us
with the type-I reality inducing experiences in us.5 What is responsible for
our interpretive predicament is not the practice of divorcing the objects of
our investigations from our subjective experiences but the practice of not
distinguishing between the objects of our investigations, which form part of
the type-II reality constructed by us, and whatever it is that induces subjec-
tive experiences in us, which is or belongs to the epistemically inaccessible
reality of type I. Again, according to Fuchs et al. [54],
Instruments are the Copenhagen surrogate for experience. Being
objective and independent of the agent using them, instruments
miss the central point of QBism, giving rise to the notorious
measurement problem, which has vexed physicists to this day.
In actual fact, it is QBism that misses the central point of instruments. The
possibility of drawing a line of separation between subject and object, in
such a way as to be able to refer to objects without referring to experiences,
is a sine qua non of empirical science. This possibility calls for a language
that is suitable for the unambiguous communication of “what we have done
and what we have learned” (Refs. [35, pp. 39, 72, 89] and [36, pp. 3, 24]).
The need for this language has nothing to do with the particular field of
experience to which it is applied. We especially need to use it when we
stumble upon a new field of experience, so that “there is, strictly speaking,
no new observational problem in atomic physics” [35, p. 89]. There is no
new observational problem because in quantum physics we are doing what
we have always done: setting up experiments and reporting their results,
in suitable language, which Bohr used to call “plain language,” “classical
language,” or “the language of classical physics.” (Bohr never asserted that
quantum mechanics requires classical physics itself.)
5This conflation is likewise responsible for the insolubility of the “hard problem of
consciousness,” which most philosophers of mind take to be the problem of explaining
how objective physical processes in a brain give rise to subjective experiences. Whatever
gives rise to experiences belongs to the epistemically inaccessible (type-I) reality, whereas
the processes investigated by science belong to the empirical (type-II) reality, which being
distilled from our experiences cannot give rise to experiences.
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What is new, and radically so, is that the properties of quantum systems
are defined by the experimental conditions in which they are measured—i.e.,
by instruments—and that they only exist if and when they are measured.
(Measurements are not confined to physics laboratories. Any object capable
of providing information about a quantum system functions as a measuring
device.) Quantum mechanics opens up a new and wholly unanticipated field
of experience, revealing a quantum reality through statistical correlations
between (classically describable) preparations and (classically describable)
outcomes—i.e., between the properties and readings of instruments. It is
these correlations that the mathematical apparatus of quantum mechanics
serves to calculate: “the physical content of quantum mechanics is exhausted
by its power to formulate statistical laws governing observations obtained
under conditions specified in plain language” [36, p. 12].
As a calculus of correlations, quantum mechanics presupposes the events
to which, and on the basis of which, it serves to assign probabilities. It
thus presupposes the existence of objects with outcome-indicating proper-
ties, and it rules out the application of the superposition principle to dif-
ferent outcome-indicating properties since it is logically inconsistent, it is
self-contradictory, for an outcome-indicating device to enter a superposition
of different outcome-indicating properties (because then it would not be an
outcome-indicating device). The standard objection to this point is that
quantum mechanics has no way of telling us when an observable serves to
indicate an outcome, and hence when it is capable of entering a superpo-
sition of its eigenstates. Therefore every observable must “in principle” be
capable of entering such a superposition. Yet if quantum mechanics is a
calculus of correlations, then it presupposes both the events to which and
the events on the basis of which it serves to assign probabilities. It presup-
poses observables that are not capable of entering superpositions of their
eigenstates. If such observables did not exist, quantum mechanics would be
a subject without a subject matter.
It is tempting to attribute the exemption of outcome-indicating observ-
ables from the superposition principle to the intrinsic definiteness of our
experience, which underlies Kant’s principle of thoroughgoing determina-
tion. QBism is the latest and most uncompromising version of this strategy.
Yet to subject everything but an individual’s “own direct internal awareness
of her own private experience” to the superposition principle, as QBists do,
is overkill. What QBists rightly object to is the duplication of instruments
that results from conceiving them once as “objective and independent of the
agent using them” and once again as aspects of our experience. It won’t do
to take refuge in the latter way of thinking about instruments only when
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the former (which allows outcome-indicating observables to enter superposi-
tions of their eigenstates) leads to absurdity or poses a certifiably insoluble
problem. According to the QBist, the instruments we experience are the
only instruments there are.
It would, however, be more correct to say that the instruments we ex-
perience are the only instruments we can have knowledge of and talk about.
But if (and insofar as) we are in possession of communicable knowledge of
instruments, instruments are objective, not in the sense of belonging to the
empirically inaccessible type-I reality but in the sense of forming part of
the empirical type-II reality. Niels and Albert can talk about an appara-
tus without distinguishing between the apparatus experienced by Niels and
the apparatus experienced by Albert and thus without reference to their re-
spective experiences. One begins to understand the truth behind the rather
absurd claim by Mermin (“a QBist in the making” [55]) that “All versions
of Copenhagen objectify each of the diverse family of users of science into a
single common piece of apparatus” [13].
Thus even though outcome-indicating properties are exempt from the
superposition principle because they are experienced, they are nevertheless
objective, albeit in the empirical rather than the transcendental sense. While
they are independent neither of human experience nor of the community of
users of science, they are independent of the specific experiences of any
particular user.
5 The QBist Agenda
Three points dominate the QBist agenda: the construal of quantum-mecha-
nical probabilities as single-user Bayesian probabilities, the intention to put
“the scientist back into science” so as to restore “the balance between sub-
ject and object” [12], and the demonstration that quantum mechanics is
“explicitly local” [54].
The Bayesian understanding of probability as a degree of confidence or
belief denies the existence of external criteria—external to the individual—
for declaring a probability judgment right or wrong. The only criterion is
coherence between the individual’s beliefs. Because, in fact, there are such
criteria—to wit, the objective measurement outcomes on the basis of which
probabilities are assigned—the Bayesian construal of probability is unsuited
for quantum mechanics. It is true that different individuals may assign
probabilities on the basis of different objective outcomes and, hence, may
use different quantum states, but this does not affect the objective nature of
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the events on which their probability assignments are based. These events
are external to the individual without being external to the community
of users of science (i.e., without belonging to the transcendental reality of
type I.)
Again, the need to put “the scientist back into science” arises only if one
assumes that science is concerned with a mind-independent (type-I) reality,
as Schro¨dinger did in his essay “Nature and the Greeks” [56, pp. 95–97], in
which he deplored that “I actually do cut out my mind when I construct
the real world around me”:
the scientific picture of the real world around me is very deficient.
It . . . is ghastly silent about all and sundry that is really near
to our heart, that really matters to us. It cannot tell us a word
about red and blue, bitter and sweet, physical pain and physical
delight; it knows nothing of beautiful and ugly, good or bad, God
and eternity. . . . And the reason for this disconcerting situation
is just this, that, for the purpose of constructing the picture of
the external world, we have used the greatly simplifying device
or cutting our own personality out, removing it.
For Fuchs et al. [54] this is reason enough to claim that Schro¨dinger “takes
a QBist view of science.” In reality, though, Schro¨dinger merely objects
to the transcendental objectivist view of science. If one takes science to
be concerned with the empirical (type-II) reality objectified by us, there
is nothing to be deplored, for the fact that the objectifying subjects, their
quality-rich experiences, and their ethical and aesthetic values cannot be
objectified, does not mean that they are therefore unreal.
It is worth mentioning that the qualitative aspects of our experience
include the qualitative aspects of time and space. Weyl [57] made this point
with respect to space, stressing “with what little right mathematics may
claim to expose the intuitional nature of space”:
Geometry contains no trace of that which makes the space of
intuition what it is in virtue of its own entirely distinctive qual-
ities which are not shared by “states of addition-machines” and
“gas-mixtures” and “systems of solutions of linear equations.” It
is left to metaphysics to make this “comprehensible” or indeed
to show why and in what sense it is incomprehensible. We as
mathematicians . . . must recognise with humility that our con-
ceptual theories enable us to grasp only one aspect of the nature
of space, that which, moreover, is most formal and superficial.
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Much the same applies to time. What we can objectify is the spatial re-
lations between objects and the temporal relations between states or the
spatiotemporal relations between events. What we cannot objectify is the
qualitative character of the warp and woof of our experience, phenomenal
space and phenomenal time, including our subjective here and now. As
I cannot objectify the particular point in space from which I survey my
surroundings—a fact that nobody seems to deplore—so I cannot objectify
my now as a particular point in time at which I remember a past and
anticipate a future—a fact that Einstein famously regretted [58] and that
Mermin [12, 59] mistakenly believes QBism can redress.6
The third point on the QBist agenda is to demonstrate that quantum
mechanics is “explicitly local” [54]. The demonstration offered consists in
the claim that “space-like separated events . . . cannot be experienced by any
single agent,” and that therefore quantum correlations “refer only to time-
like separated events: the acquisition of experiences by any single agent.”
By giving “each quantum state a home . . . localized in space and time—
namely, the physical site of the agent who assigns it,” QBism “expels once
and for all the fear that quantum mechanics leads to ‘spooky action at a
distance’.” [60]
In point of fact, by situating each quantum state at the physical site of
the agent who assigns it, QBism contradicts its claim that, with the excep-
tion of the agent’s “own direct internal awareness of her own private expe-
rience” [54], all external systems, including other agents, must be treated
quantum-mechanically. If the agent has an objective position (a physical
site at which she is located), then the pointer needle that serves to indicate
an outcome, too, has one. If the needle has a position only in the mind of
the agent who experiences it, then the agent can have a position only in the
mind of someone who experiences her. One cannot have it both ways.
It is not that easy to expel the fear that quantum mechanics leads to
spooky action at a distance. Suppose that Alice and Bob, having performed
a large number of spin measurements on particles prepared “in” the singlet
state, get together to compare notes. What they find is clear evidence of the
correlations that are predicted by the singlet state. The claim that quantum
correlations refer only to time-like separated events is therefore wrong. The
“protection” provided by “truly personal quantum-state assignments” [43]
does nothing to prevent the specter of action at a distance from being there
6There remains the question why a QBist should be worried about this. What does
it matter if the qualitative aspects of our experience are not objectifiable, or not quite
as objectifiable as the the quantitative ones? Are they therefore unreal? Only a greedy
reductionist or a transcendental objectivist would think so.
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“as doggedly as it ever was.” The reason local explanations—whether in
terms of a common cause or via action at a distance—do not work needs to be
understood, not swept under the rug by declaring that quantum correlations
“by their very nature” [54] only refer to time-like separated events.
6 Semantic consistency
The measurement problem is a consistency problem. What we
have to show is that the dynamics, which generally produces en-
tanglement between two coupled systems, is consistent with the
assumption that something definite or determinate happens in a
measurement process. The basic question is whether it is consis-
tent with the unitary dynamics to take the macroscopic measure-
ment “pointer” or, in general, the macroworld as definite.
— Jeffrey Bub [61]
Can the semantic consistency of the theory be demonstrated without im-
plicitly referring to the intrinsic definiteness of our experience? The aim of
this section is to demonstrate that it can. The term “semantic consistency”
was coined by von Weizsa¨cker [62, p. 260]. By the semantic consistency of a
theory he meant “that its preconceptions, how we interpret the mathemati-
cal structure physically, will themselves obey the laws of the theory.” Thus
if quantum mechanics is semantically consistent, even outcome-indicating
observables will obey the theory’s correlation laws—even though they are
exempt from the superposition principle, and this not only FAPP (“for all
practical purposes”).
Bub [61] has claimed that “unitary quantum dynamics” can be made
consistent with the existence of measurement outcomes if we reject the
eigenvalue-eigenstate link and in its place stipulate that “the decoherence
‘pointer’ selected by environmental decoherence” is always definite. Deco-
herence then “guarantees the continued definiteness or persistent objectivity
of the macroworld.” Decoherence, however, merely displaces the coherence
of the system composed of apparatus and object system into the degrees of
freedom of the environment, causing the objectification problem to reappear
as a statement about the system composed of environment, apparatus, and
object system. Because the mixture obtained by tracing out the environ-
ment does not admit an ignorance interpretation, it can resolve the problem
only FAPP.
In order to demonstrate the semantic consistency of quantum mechanics
beyond “FAPP,” we must desist from conceiving of the objective world as if
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it were accessible to our senses on all scales, and therefore spatially differ-
entiated “all the way down,” which is what formulations of the theory that
feature deterministically evolving quantum states implicitly assumes. The
demonstration begins by showing that quantum mechanics itself implies the
incompleteness of the world’s spatiotemporal differentiation.
While quantum mechanics can tell us that the probability of finding
a particle in a given region of space is 1, it is incapable of giving us a
region of space. For this a detector is needed. A detector is needed not
only to indicate the presence of a particle in a region but also—and in
the first place—to physically realize a region, so as to make it possible to
attribute to a particle the property of being inside. Speaking more generally,
a macroscopic apparatus is needed not only to indicate the possession of a
property by a quantum system but also—and in the first place—to make
a set of properties available for attribution to the system. (All of this is
vintage Bohr.)
But if detectors are needed to realize regions of space, space cannot be
intrinsically partitioned. If we conceive of it as partitioned, we can do so
only as far as regions of space can be realized—i.e., to the extent that the
requisite detectors are physically possible. This extent is limited by the
indeterminacy principle, inasmuch as this rules out the existence of detec-
tors with arbitrarily small sensitive regions that are (and remain) sharply
localized relative to each other. If such regions cannot be realized (as the
sensitive regions of detectors) then they are not available for attribution (as
positions). Hence, if conceptually we keep partitioning space into smaller
and smaller regions, we will reach a point beyond which the distinctions
we make between regions no longer correspond to anything in the physical
world. We can conceive of a partition of the physical world into finite regions
so small that none of them can be attributed (as a position) because none of
them is available for attribution. In other words, physical space cannot be
realistically modeled as an actually existing manifold of intrinsically distinct
points. In yet other words, the spatial differentiation of the physical world
is incomplete—it does not go “all the way down.”
The same goes for the world’s temporal differentiation, and this not only
because of the relativistic interdependence of distances and durations. Just
as the properties of quantum systems or the values of quantum observables
need to be realized—made available for attribution—by macroscopic devices,
so the times at which properties or values are possessed need to be realized
by macroscopic clocks. And just as it is impossible for macroscopic devices
to realize sharp positions, so it is impossible for macroscopic clocks to realize
sharp times [63]. Hence, neither the spatial nor the temporal differentiation
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of the physical world goes “all the way down.”
In a world that is incompletely differentiated spacewise, the next best
thing to a sharp trajectory is a trajectory that is so sharp that the bun-
dle of sharp trajectories over which it is statistically distributed is never
probed. In other words, the next best thing to an object with a sharp po-
sition is an object whose position probability distribution is and remains
so narrow that there are no detectors with narrower position probability
distributions—detectors that could probe the region over which the object’s
position extends. If the spatiotemporal differentiation of the physical world
does not go “all the way down,” such objects must exist.7 If I call them
“macroscopic objects,” and if I call their positions “macroscopic positions,”
it is not intended to mean that they are so large and/or massive as to behave
like classical objects FAPP, but in the more rigorous sense just spelled out.
By the “macroworld” I shall mean the totality of macroscopic positions.
What can be deduced from this characterization of macroscopic positions
is that the events by which their values are indicated are (diachronically)
correlated in ways that are consistent with the laws of motion that quantum
mechanics yields in the classical limit. For any given time t the following
holds: if every event that indicates a macroscopic position prior to the time
t were taken into account, then—given the necessarily finite accuracy of
position-indicating events—every event that indicates a macroscopic posi-
tion at a later time would be consistent with all earlier position-indicating
events and the classical laws of motion. There is, of course, one necessary
exception: in order to permit a macroscopic pointer to indicate the value of
an observable, its position must be allowed to change unpredictably if and
when it serves to indicate an outcome.
Macroscopic objects thus follow trajectories that are only counterfactu-
ally indefinite. Their positions are “smeared out” only in relation to an
imaginary spatiotemporal background that is more differentiated than the
physical world. No value-indicating event reveals the indefiniteness of a
macroscopic position in the only way it could, through a departure from
what the classical laws predict. The testable correlations between outcomes
of measurements of macroscopic positions are therefore consistent with both
the classical and the quantum laws [64, 65], and this makes it unnecessary
to invoke the intrinsic definiteness of our experience in order to account for
the existence of measurement outcomes.
7While decoherence arguments can solve the objectification problem only FAPP, they
quantitatively support the existence of such objects.
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7 In search of “quantum reality”
I received a telephone call one day at the graduate college at
Princeton from Professor Wheeler, in which he said, “Feynman,
I know why all electrons have the same charge and the same
mass.” “Why?” “Because, they are all the same electron!”
— Richard P. Feynman [66]
We are now in a position to think about the objectifiable implications of
the quantum-mechanical correlation laws without having to keep in mind
our role as experiencing and objectifying subjects. The safest way to pro-
ceed is to use that formulation of quantum mechanics which carries the
least metaphysical baggage, which is due to Feynman [67]. It carries the
least metaphysics baggage because all it essentially does is assign probability
amplitudes to alternatives, which are defined as sequences of measurement
outcomes, or as the continuum limits of such sequences.
Both the wave-function formulation and Feynman’s feature a pair of
dynamical principles. In the former they are unitary evolution and col-
lapse/objectification. In the latter they are summation over amplitudes
(followed by taking the absolute square of the sum) and summation over
probabilities (preceded by taking the absolute square of each amplitude).
From the wave-function point of view, unitary evolution seems natural; what
calls for explanation is collapse (the projection postulate) and objectifica-
tion (postulated via the eigenvalue–eigenstate link). From Feynman’s point
of view, adding probabilities seems natural, inasmuch as this conforms to
classical probability theory; what calls for explanation is why we have to add
amplitudes. What is at issue, therefore, is not what causes wave functions
to collapse and measurement to have outcomes but why we have to add
amplitudes whenever quantum mechanics requires us to do so. In answer to
this question I have proposed the following interpretive principle:
(I) Whenever quantum mechanics requires us to add amplitudes, the dis-
tinctions we make between the alternatives correspond to nothing in
the physical world [65, 68].
This is a statement about the structure or constitution of the physical world,
not a statement merely of our practical or conceptual limitations. Thus while
the wave-function formulation stumps us with the dual problem of collapse
and objectification, Feynman’s formulation presents us with a question to
which there is a clear answer. The reason why quantum mechanics requires
us to add amplitudes is that, whenever it does, the distinctions we make
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between alternatives cannot be objectified (represented as real). The issue
is not how measurement outcomes become objective but why distinctions
we tend to make cannot be considered objective.
We shall apply the new interpretive principle to two paradigmatic setups,
one concerning distinctions between regions of space, the other concerning
distinctions between things. In the context of a two-slit experiment (or any
two-way interferometer experiment, for that matter), (I) tells us that the
distinction we make between pL = “the particle went through the left slit
(L)” and pR = “the particle went through the right slit (R)” corresponds
to nothing in the physical world. In some sense the particle took both slits,
but not in the sense of the conjunction pL∧ pR, for one never sees a particle
emerging both from the left slit and from the right slit. To say that the
particle went through both slits can only mean that it went through the
union of the two slits without going through a particular slit and without
being divided into parts that go through different slits. This confirms our
earlier conclusion that physical space cannot be an intrinsically differentiated
expanse; if the parts of space defined by the slit were intrinsically distinct,
a particle could not go through both slits in the sense just spelled out.8
Now consider the elastic scattering of two identical particles initially
moving northward and southward, respectively. The probability of eventu-
ally finding one particle moving eastward and one particle moving westward
has the form
|〈EW |NS〉 ± 〈WE|NS〉|2,
where the sign depends on whether the particles are bosons or fermions.
Because amplitudes are added rather than probabilities, (I) applies, and it
tells us that the distinction we make between the alternative identifications
N = E,S =W or N =W,S = E
corresponds to nothing in the physical world. There is no answer to the ques-
tion: “Which outgoing particle is identical with which incoming particle?”
What does this tell us about the reality revealed by the quantum-mechanical
correlation laws? The answer I propose is that the incoming particles (and
therefore the outgoing ones as well) are one and the same entity. Initially
we observe two distinct properties, the property of moving northward and
the property of moving southward, and subsequently we again observe two
distinct properties, the property of moving eastward and the property of
moving westward. We do not really observe two distinct things instantiat-
ing two distinct properties—this is one “two” too many. What we observe
8For a more detailed argument see [65, Sec. 4].
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is perfectly consistent with saying that, both initially and subsequently,
we observe the same thing twice, with distinct properties.9 What’s more,
there is no compelling reason to believe that this identity ceases when it
ceases to have observable consequences owing to the presence of individuat-
ing properties. We are free to take the view that intrinsically each particle
is numerically identical with every other particle. What presents itself here
and now with these properties and what presents itself there and then with
those properties is one and the same entity. In what follows I shall call it
“Being.” If you prefer any other name, be my guest.10
8 Manifestation
Because it is necessary to distinguish between (i) properties that only exist if
and when they are measured and (ii) properties that are capable of indicating
outcomes, the distinction between a classical or macroscopic domain and
a non-classical or quantum domain is amply justified. But how can we
understand the relation between the two domains, beyond the linguistic
necessity of speaking about the quantum domain in terms of correlations
between macroscopic events, which was stressed by Bohr [11]? The answer
I propose is that the distinction between the two domains is essentially a
distinction between the manifested world and its manifestation.
One of the reasons it is so hard to make sense of the quantum theory
is that it answers a question we are not in the habit of asking. Instead of
asking what the ultimate constituents of matter are and how they interact
and combine, we need to broaden our repertoire of explanatory concepts and
inquire into the manifestation of the familiar world of everyday experience.
Since the kinematical properties of microphysical objects—their positions,
momenta, energies, etc.—only exist if and when they are indicated by the
behavior of macroscopic objects, microphysical objects cannot play the role
of constituent parts. They can only play an instrumental role in the mani-
festation of macroscopic objects.
9If this seems counterintuitive, it is because we tend to think of the “parts of space”
as self-existent (rather than as being distinct regions only by virtue of being separately
realized), and that we tend to think of whatever is contained in distinct regions as sepa-
rately and independently existing things: “things claim an existence independent of one
another” whenever they “lie in different parts of space” [69].
10According to French [70], quantum mechanics is “compatible with two distinct meta-
physical ‘packages,’ one in which the particles are regarded as individuals and one in which
they are not.” Esfeld [71] disagrees: it is not “a serious option to regard quantum objects
as possessing a primitive thisness (haecceity) so that permuting these objects amounts to
a real difference.”
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Because the manifestation of the macroworld includes the manifestation
of both space and time, it cannot be conceived as a process that takes place
in space and time. We keep looking for the origin of the universe at the
beginning of time, but this is an error of perspective. I propose to identify
the origin of the universe with the Being that was introduced in the previous
section, a Being intrinsically undifferentiated, transcendent of spatial and
temporal distinctions. By entering into reflexive spatial relations—i.e., self-
relations, relations between numerically identical relata—this Being gives
rise to
1. what looks like a multiplicity of relata if the reflexive quality of the
relations is ignored,11 and
2. what looks like a substantial expanse if the spatial quality of the rela-
tions is reified.
As Leibniz said, omnibus ex nihilo ducendis sufficit unum—one is enough
to create everything from nothing.
The view put forward here goes farther in relationism—the doctrine that
space and time are a family of spatial and temporal relations holding among
the material constituents of the universe—in that it also affirms that the
ultimate material constituents are numerically identical and formless. While
fundamental particles are routinely described as pointlike, what is meant is
that they lack internal structure. Lack of internal structure is suggested
by the scale-invariance of a particle’s effective cross-section(s) in scattering
experiments with probe particles that are themselves pointlike in this sense,
but it can be verified only down to the de Broglie wavelength of the probe
particles. Hence, there can be no evidence of absence of internal structure,
let alone evidence of a literally pointlike form. For further reasons why
fundamental particles ought to be conceived as formless, see [65, Sect. 9].
Conceived accordingly, the shapes of things resolve themselves into sets of
spatial relations between formless and numerically identical relata. The
truism that the universe lacks a position because it lacks external spatial
relations thus has a fitting complement: a fundamental particle lacks a form
because it lacks internal spatial relations.
The manifestation of the familiar world of everyday experience consists
in a transition from the undifferentiated state of Being to a state that allows
11Because the relations are reflexive, the multiplicity of the relata is apparent rather
than real. Does this mean that the material world is unreal, as some illusionist philosophies
assert? By no means, for the material world owes its existence to a multitude of reflexive
relations, and these are real.
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itself to be described in the classical language of interacting objects and
causally related events, a transition from absolute unity to the multiplicity of
the macroworld. Seen in this light, quantum theory reverses the explanatory
arrow of common sense and classical or folk physics: instead of explaining
wholes in terms of interacting parts, it suggests that the multiplicity of the
world emerges from an intrinsically undifferentiated reality.
The transition from the absolute unity of Being to the multiplicity of the
macroworld passes through several stages. Across these stages, the world’s
differentiation into distinguishable regions of space and distinguishable ob-
jects with definite properties is progressively realized. There is a stage at
which Being presents itself as a multitude of formless particles. This stage is
probed by high-energy physics and known to us through correlations between
the counterfactual clicks of imagined detectors, i.e., in terms of transition
probabilities between in-states and out-states. There are stages that mark
the emergence of form, albeit as a type of form that cannot yet be visual-
ized. The forms of nucleons, nuclei, and atoms can only be mathematically
described, as probability distributions over abstract spaces of increasingly
higher dimensions. At energies low enough for atoms to be stable, it be-
comes possible to conceive of objects with fixed numbers of components,
and these we describe in terms of correlations between the possible outcomes
of unperformed measurements. The next stage—closest to the manifested
world—contains the first objects with forms that can be visualized—the
atomic configurations of molecules. But it is only the final stage—the mani-
fested macroscopic world—that contains the actual detector clicks and the
actual measurement outcomes that have made it possible to discover and
study the correlations that govern the quantum domain.
One begins to understand why the general theoretical framework of con-
temporary physics is a probability calculus, and why the probabilities are
assigned to measurement outcomes. If quantum mechanics concerns a tran-
sition through which the differentiation of the world into distinguishable
objects and distinguishable regions of space is gradually realized, the ques-
tion arises as to how the intermediate stages are to be described—the stages
at which the differentiation is incomplete and the distinguishability between
objects or regions of space is only partially realized. The answer is that
whatever is not completely distinguishable can only be described by as-
signing probabilities to what is completely distinguishable, namely to the
different possible outcomes of a measurement. What is instrumental in the
manifestation of the world can only be described in terms of (correlations
between) events that happen or could happen in the manifested world.
Quantum mechanics thus presents us with a so far unrecognized kind
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of causality,12 which must be distinguished from its more familiar temporal
cousin.13 The usefulness of the latter, which links states or events across
time or spacetime, is confined to the world drama; it plays no part in setting
the stage for it. It helps us make sense of the manifested world as well as of
the cognate world of classical physics, but it throws no light on the process
of manifestation nor on the quantum correlations that are instrumental in
the process.
The causality associated with the atemporal process of manifestation—
the transition from the undifferentiated state of Being to the multiplicity of
the macroworld—presents the nonlocality of quantum mechanics in a new
light. The atemporal process by which Being enters into reflexive relations
and matter and space come into being as a result, is the nonlocal event par
excellence. Depending on one’s point of view, it is either coextensive with
spacetime (i.e., completely delocalized) or “outside” of spacetime (i.e., not
localized at all). Occurring in an anterior relation to space and time, it is the
common cause of all correlations, not only of the seemingly inexplicable ones
between simultaneous events in different locations but also of the seemingly
explicable ones between successive events in the same location.14
When I posit an intrinsically undifferentiated (and hence unqualifiable)
Being, which manifests the world by entering into reflexive spatial relations,
am I not referring to a transcendental (type-I) reality rather than an empir-
ical (type-II) reality? The answer is: not intentionally and not knowingly.
As the Greek philosopher–poet Xenophanes pointed out some twenty-five
centuries ago, even if our conceptions represented the world exactly as it is,
we could never know that this was the case. What can be said is this: the
fact that our models of reality are mental constructs abstracted from our
experiences does nothing to explain why most of our theoretical constructs
12Unrecognized, I believe, within the scientific literature albeit well-known to meta-
physics, inasmuch as the general philosophical pattern of a single world-essence (“Being”)
manifesting itself as a multiplicity of individual things is found throughout the world.
Some of its representatives in the Western hemisphere are the Neoplatonists, John Scot-
tus Eriugena, and the German idealists. The quintessential Eastern example is the original
(pre-illusionist) Vedanta of the Upanishads [72, 73, 74].
13While an atemporal causality does not involve a temporal sequence, process, or tran-
sition, it does involve stages by which the differentiation of the world into distinguishable
objects and distinguishable regions is progressively realized.
14It seems to me that the diachronic correlations between events in timelike relation are
as spooky as the synchronic correlations between events in spacelike relation. While we
know how to calculate either kind, we know as little of a physical process by which an
event here and now contributes to determine the probability of a later event here as we
know of a physical process by which an event here and now contributes to determine the
probability of a distant event now.
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turn out to be non-objectifiable. There has to be something about the (type-
I) reality at the origin of our our selves and our experiences that licenses
the objectification of only a very limited set of mental constructs. Although
a constructed empirical reality can never match the transcendental reality,
the former may fit the latter.
The distinction between a match and a fit, which is due to von Glasersfeld
[75], has been illustrated by the allegory of a skipper who, in the dark of
a stormy night, without navigational aids, passes a narrow strait whose
contour he does not know [76]. Epistemologically we are in the skipper’s
position. If he reaches the open sea without mishap, he has found a course
that fits the strait; if next time he takes the same course, he will again pass
safely. What he has not obtained is a map that matches the coastline. To
precisely locate at least one point of the coastline, he must come into contact
with it—at the risk of wrecking his ship. My contention is that the ideas
put forward here and in greater detail in Refs. [65, 68] fit the reality at the
origin of our experiences. No scientific theory can achieve more than that.
9 Experience
Nobody has the slightest idea how anything material could be con-
scious. Nobody even knows what it would be like to have the
slightest idea about how anything material could be conscious.
— Jerry A. Fodor [77]
Experience being the matrix of empirical knowledge, it cannot become an
object of empirical knowledge. If we seize upon quantitative aspects of
our experience and think of them as forming a mind-independent reality,
it should not perplex us that this reality cannot contain or give rise to the
quality-rich experience we have discarded in the process.
The most promising alternative to reductionism in the philosophy of
mind is panpsychism [78, 79, 80, 81, 82]. Beginning with Leibniz in the
17th Century, philosophers have argued that all physical properties are re-
lational or extrinsic, and none are in a fundamental sense non-relational or
intrinsic. This offers the possibility of situating consciousness among the
intrinsic properties of the relata which bear the relational properties. This
possibility has been considered by Bertrand Russell [83] and more recently
by Chalmers [84]. The problem with it is that it is hard to imagine how
the consciousnesses of a myriad of particles can constitute the unified con-
sciousness that we enjoy. If however we take into account not only that all
physical properties are relational but also that all relational properties are
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reflexive, so that the relata are identically the same Being, the concept of
consciousness as an intrinsic aspect of the relata comes into its own.
It stands to reason—at any rate, it makes good sense—that Being does
not simply manifest the world; rather, Being manifests the world to itself.
Being relates to the world not only as the substance that constitutes it
but also as the consciousness that contains it. It is at once the single sub-
stance by which the world exists and the ultimate self or subject for which
it exists. How, then, might we, as conscious beings, be related to this ul-
timate self or subject? This question has been answered in considerable
detail and on a solid experiential foundation by the Indian philosopher (and
freedom fighter, and mystic) Sri Aurobindo [5]. In keeping with a more
than millennium-long philosophical tradition [72], Sri Aurobindo [6] posits
an Ultimate Reality whose intrinsic nature is (objectively speaking) infinite
Quality and (subjectively speaking) infinite Delight. This has the power to
manifest its inherent Quality/Delight in finite forms, and the closest descrip-
tion of this manifestation is that of an all-powerful consciousness creating
its own content.
In the native poise of this consciousness, its single self is coextensive
with its content and identical with the substance that constitutes the con-
tent. There, but only there, it is true that esse est percipi (to be is to be
perceived). A first self-modification of this supramental consciousness leads
to a poise in which the one and only self adopts a multitude of standpoints,
localizing itself multiply within the content of its consciousness and viewing
the same in perspective. It is in this secondary poise that the dimensions
of experiential space (viewer-centered depth and lateral extent) come into
being. It is also here that the dichotomy between subject and object, or self
and substance, becomes a reality.15
Probably the most adequate description of the process by which the
original self assumes a multitude of standpoints is that of a multiple concen-
tration of consciousness. A further self-modification of the original creative
consciousness occurs when this multiple concentration becomes exclusive.
We all know the phenomenon of exclusive concentration, when conscious-
ness is focused on a single object or task, while other goings-on are registered
subconsciously, if at all. A similar phenomenon transforms individuals who
are conscious of their essential identity into individuals who have lost sight
of this identity and, as a consequence, have lost access to the supramen-
15To assume that the ultimate object is one with the ultimate subject and to show how
they become distinct may be the only way that the explanatory gap between object and
subject [85] can be bridged.
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tal view of things. Their consciousness is mental, which means not only
that it belongs to what appears to be a separate individual but also that it
perceives or represents the world as a multitude of separate objects. Men-
tally conscious beings thus come into existence not only by an evolution
from seemingly unconscious matter but also, and in the first place, by a
multiple exclusive concentration of the creative consciousness inherent in
Being.
If this multiple exclusive concentration is carried to its logical conclu-
sion, the result is a world whose inhabitants lack both the ability to generate
ideas (which is a function of the principle of mind) and the power to exe-
cute them (which is a function of the principle of life).16 And because the
latter is also responsible for the existence of individual forms, the result is a
world of formless individuals—the fundamental particles of physics. This is
how the original creative consciousness came to be “involved” in mind, how
mind came to be “involved” in life, and how life came to be “involved” in
formless particles. And because these principles are “involved” in formless
particles, matter is capable of evolving life, life is capable of evolving mind,
and mental consciousness can and is bound to eventually evolve the supra-
mental consciousness—the infinite conscious force by which Being manifests
the world.
The action of this supramental consciousness is primarily qualitative and
infinite and only secondarily quantitative and finite. Essentially, mind is the
agent of the supermind’s secondary, quantifying, and delimiting action. But
when it is separated in self-awareness from its supramental parent conscious-
ness, as it is in us, it not only divides ad infinitum but also takes the resulting
multiplicity for the original truth or fact. This is why we tend to construct
reality from the bottom up, on an intrinsically and completely differentiated
space or space-time, out of locally instantiated physical properties, or else by
aggregation, out of a multitude of individual substances. And that, at bot-
tom, is why making sense of quantum mechanics is so hard, for (as we found
in Sect. 6) the spatial differentiation of the physical world does not go “all
the way down.” Reality is structured by a progressive self-differentiation of
16A hundred years ago it seemed obvious to many that life could not have emerged from
utterly lifeless matter, just as today it seems obvious to many that experience cannot
have emerged from utterly non-experiential matter. Yet today no one appears to seriously
doubt that life did emerge from utterly lifeless matter; the seemingly insuperable “hard
problem of life” simply dissolved. So why should it not be the same with the “hard
problem of consciousness,” a hundred years from now? As Strawson [82] has pointed out,
one cannot draw such a parallel unless life is considered completely apart from conscious
experience. If consciousness is essential to life, as may well be the case, one cannot reduce
life to physics via chemistry if consciousness cannot be reduced along with it.
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Being that does not “bottom out,” and this makes it impossible to construct
reality from the bottom up.
10 Concluding thoughts
But the fact that we find ourselves in a quantum world where
measurement is possible . . . will surely involve the same sort of
explanation as the fact that we find ourselves in a world where
we are able to exist as carbon-based life forms.
— Jeffrey Bub [86, p. 234]
Quantum physics does not explain “how nature does it.” The theory only
explains—via conservation laws—why certain things won’t happen. This is
exactly what one would expect if the force at work in the world were an
infinite (unlimited) force operating under self-imposed constraints. In that
case we would have no reason to be surprised or dismayed by the impos-
sibility of explaining the quantum-mechanical correlation laws in terms of
physical mechanisms, for it would be self-contradictory to invoke a physical
mechanism to explain the working of an infinite force. What would need
explaining is why (for which purpose) this force works under the particular
constraints that it does. Where efficient causality fails, final causality takes
over.
It stands to reason that setting the stage for the drama of evolution calls
for the existence of sufficiently stable objects that have spatial extent—
objects that “occupy” space. Because this stage has been set by carrying
the multiple exclusive concentration of the consciousness one with Being
to its logical conclusion, which resulted in a world of forms that resolve
themselves into spatial relations between an apparent multitude of formless
relata, such objects will appear to be “made” (i.e., manifested by means) of
finite numbers of formless objects. But, as I have argued elsewhere [7, 8, 9],
the existence of objects that (i) have spatial extent, (ii) neither collapse nor
explode as soon as they are formed, and (iii) are composed of finite numbers
of objects that lack spatial extent, not only requires the validity of quantum
mechanics but also goes a long way toward establishing the other well-tested
laws of contemporary physics. The validity of quantum mechanics may thus
be a necessary consequence of the manner in which—and the purpose for
which—the physical world came into being.
In concluding, I would like to put in perspective our attempts to make
sense of this particular world in which we find ourselves. We tend to think
of the evolution of consciousness as the successive emergence of increasingly
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adequate ways of experiencing a world that exists in itself, out of relation
to any kind of consciousness or experience. And we tend to think that
our way of experiencing this world is more or less adequate to the task of
understanding it. But this is not likely to be the case. As Nagel [87, p. 10]
wrote, “too many hypotheses and systems of thought in philosophy and
elsewhere are based on the bizarre view that we, at this point in history,
are in possession of the basic forms of understanding needed to comprehend
absolutely anything.” The mistake, however, does not lie in thinking that
our ways of experiencing and understanding are adequate to the task of
comprehending the world. The mistake is to think that there is a world
which exists out of relation to any kind of consciousness or experience, in
which consciousness can nevertheless emerge. There are only different ways
in which Being presents itself to itself, including a Houdiniesque way in
which its intrinsic consciousness and freedom are “involved” in a world that
appears to be governed by mechanical necessity and chance.
Our very concepts of space, time, and matter are conditioned by and
dependent on the manner in which we, at this point in history, experience
the world—the manner in which Being presents itself to itself in the mode of
experience to which it has attained in us. Matter, then, can not be the ori-
gin of consciousness.17 It is consciousness that has created matter, first by
carrying its multiple exclusive concentration to the point of being involved
in a multitude of formless particles, and again by evolving our present mode
of experiencing the world, which has given us the ability to integrate images
into three-dimensional objects from which the experiencing subject can ab-
stract itself—an ability that earlier modes of human consciousness did not
possess [89].
There are expressions of these earlier modes that reveal how they differ
from our present mode. Consider, for instance, the ancient notion that the
world is contained in a sphere, which has the fixed stars attached to its
boundary, the firmament. We cannot but ask: what is outside that sphere?
Those who held this notion could not, because for them the third dimension
of perceptual space—viewer-centered depth—did not at all have the reality
that it has for us. This is why they could not handle perspective in drawing
and painting, and why they were unable to arrive at the subject-free stance
which is a prerequisite of modern science. All this became possible only
during the Renaissance.
17The discussion by Hut et al. [88] of the math-matter-mind triangle may be relevant
in this context. The triangle suggests the circularity of the views that mathematics is a
creation of mind, that mind arises out of matter, and that matter is governed by mathe-
matical laws.
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While our present mode of consciousness has enabled us to discover much
that is relevant to understanding our evolutionary past, our tendency to re-
gard its experience of the world as the definite and final experience of what
there is prevents us from envisioning modes of consciousness that transcend
our present time- and space-bound mode. As the latter has enriched the pre-
scientific mode with a new experiential dimension—viewer-centered depth—
so will the next mode enrich our present mode, with the likely result that our
present, scientific and philosophical understanding of the world will come to
seem as dated as the mythological understanding of the pre-scientific era
seems today. Just as the mythological understanding could not foresee the
technological explosion made possible by science, so our scientific imagina-
tion is incapable of foreseeing the radical changes that might be wrought by
the evolution of a new mode of experience.
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